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Introduction
The European Union had been the largest trading power of the
world for several years. Successive enlargements as well as special
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements helped to foster this po-
sition. The leading trade position has contributed to an increasing
EU role in global economy, and probably going to contribute to
it in the next decades. 
The European Union, however, has a vital interest in seeing sta-
bility, better governance and economic development at its South-
ern and Eastern borders. Trade policy was and still is one of the
most effective instruments to reach this purpose. A great variety
of trade related agreements characterise the current structure of
relations with the neighbors: agreements allowing the free move-
ment of goods, services and production factors, customs union
agreements, free trade agreements with higher or lower harmon-
isation commitments to EU regulations. The EU has to find op-
timal solutions that increase the competitiveness both of the EU
and the neighboring regions, but also solutions that are politically
mutually acceptable and sustainable. In our study we give a short
summary of the development of EU trade policy with the neigh-
borhood and an evaluation on current trends and some future
prospects. 
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The Structure 
of Trade Relations with Neighbors
EFTA/EEA
The European Economic Community as an economic integration
shaped its foreign economic ties with its neighbors from the be-
ginnings. As a concurring institution to the EEC, the EFTA (the
European Free Trade Association) was established by the Stock-
holm Convention in 1960, for countries not willing (or not able)
to join to a more centralised integration. The EFTA have disman-
tled tariff for industrial goods among members, but did not har-
monize the external tariffs. Although the EFTA turned out to be
effective in fostering foreign trade inside the area, the attractiveness
of the EC/EU was stronger: in 1973 Britain and Denmark, in
1986 Portugal joined the EC, while Austria, Sweden and Finland
became EU members in 1995. 
Before the first wave of accession, in 1972, the EEC signed free
trade agreements with the EFTA countries. The agreements abol-
ished customs duties and restrictions for all industrial goods.
In 1992, just as the Single Market was supposed to become a
reality, the EU and the remaining EFTA countries – except
Switzerland – signed the Treaty about the European Economic
Area. The EEA was definitely created for those EFTA countries,
which were not willing to join the European Union as full mem-
bers, but willing to become members of the Single Market. Cur-
rently Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are the non-EU-mem-
ber countries in the EEA. Switzerland, also in the group of these
EFTA countries, signed bilateral agreement with the EU, with
more or less similar content. The EEA offers the four freedoms
(free movement of goods, services, labor and capital), and thus the
access to the internal market. These countries are not part of CAP,
however, and their agricultural products have to face quite high
tariff barriers (and quotas) when entering the EU internal market. 
Their status contains a limitation of sovereignty for the non-
member EEA countries: they are adopting the changes of the ac-
quis automatically, without taking part in the institutions and thus
in the decision making on the given issues. The Swiss bilateral
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agreements with the EU lack this automatism. Overall, the EEA
remains a club for those rich European countries who could but
do not want to join the EU.
Trade policy with the Southern neighbors
The Mediterranean has always received much attention from Eu-
rope (and the EC) due to its geographic proximity and the former
colonial ties. However, there was no such conception towards the
Mediterranean like the one governing the relations between Eu-
rope and the former African, Caribbean and Pacific colonies under
the Lomé Convention. The Community showed a reactive
Mediterranean policy, rather than a proactive one, mostly followed
the events and not shaped them. 
The Community signed several bilateral preferential trade agree-
ments with the countries of the region. The first generation of
partnership contracts was signed with the South-European coun-
tries. The Community’s Association Agreements with Greece in
1962 and with Turkey in 1963 aimed primarily at the reinforce-
ment of the Southern wing of NATO, due partly to some pressure
from the USA. Under the AA’s the parties wanted to create a cus-
toms union for industrial goods in a period of 20-22 years. In the
early 1970’s two other Mediterranean countries, Malta (1970) and
Cyprus (1972) concluded similar agreements with the Commu-
nity. In all of these cases, the contracting parties were European
states, (although it might be a question, as geografically partly
(Turkey) or totally (Cyprus) are located in Asia), with the expec-
tation of achieving full membership in the future. 
Morocco and Tunisia, as former protectorates of France, had al-
ready been treated in a special way based on the protocol of the
Rome Treaty. In 1963, they restarted the talks in order to renew
the negotiations and they agreed in a 5-year program on partial
partnership in 1969. The agreements mainly included trade pref-
erences. As the preferences given for the Maghreb countries would
have meant the discrimination of other Mediterranean countries,
the EC gradually made agreements for preferential treatments with
the other countries of the region. As a result, by the early 1970s
the regional agreements involved 15 countries.
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The agreements resulted in disputes, as the Mediterranean coun-
tries – depending on the interests of the single EC states – were
treated differently and their exports from agriculture could not de-
velop due to the CAP. The problematic areas included the food
and textile industries as well. The economically underdeveloped
countries were offered special preferences by the GSP. With the
joining of Great Britain, however, the preferential treatment of
Commonwealth countries decreased the value of these agree-
ments. 
The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) introduced in 1972
aimed at making up the deficiencies of the bilateral agreements
and was meant to compensate for the Northern enlargement of
the Community in 1973. It wanted to provide free-trade (one-
sided) for the industrial goods (except for some critical products,
e.g. textile, etc.) within 5 years and the EC treated some 80 % of
the exports of agricultural goods of the Mediterranean countries
preferentially and offered financial aids and the unified treatment
of the labor force issue. Within the GMP, several new agreements
had been made from 1974 onwards: Association Agreements with
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia in 1976, and with Egypt, Jordan, Syria
and Lebanon in 1977. Due to political reasons not an association
agreement, but a free trade agreement was signed with Israel in
1975, while Libya did not want to sign any agreement with the
Community.
After the 1973 crisis, the chances to achieve a general agreement
decreased. The EC protected its agriculture with one-sided ac-
tions, if needed, and the development of the light industry was
hampered by the restrictions concerning textile exports. The part-
nership agreements provided more advantages than a free-trade
agreement in theory, although they offered few consultation rights
and did not mention the prospect of full membership at all. As a
result of protests from the USA, the Mediterranean countries were
unable to provide the EC with a preferential treatment themselves.
The Southern enlargement of the EC in the 1980s had a further
negative effect on the Southern Mediterranean countries, since the
agriculture products of Spain, Portugal and Greece entered the
EC markets freely, leaving no room for the products of the other
states of the region. 
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By the 1990s, the policy of the EC concerning the Mediter-
ranean changed. With the disappearance of the confrontation be-
tween the two systems, the threats moved from the Eastern part
of Europe to the South, therefore the states of the Community
introduced a new Mediterranean policy. Maastricht and the peace
settlement in the Middle-East made it possible to give new dimen-
sions to the relations.
The approach sped up within the frames of the Euro-Mediter-
ranean Partnership (EMP) from 1995. The Euro-Mediterranean
partnership agreements, upon which the free-trade zone could be
formed, replaced the former agreements made with the Arab
countries. 
The new, global Euro-Mediterranean partnership consists of
three separate, but complementary ’pillars’:
• the pillar of politics and security, aiming to define the region
of peace and political stability,
• the economic and financial pillar, providing the setup of a mu-
tually booming area, 
• the social, cultural and humanitarian pillar, which aims at de-
veloping the human resources and the understanding between
the different cultures and relations between the civic societies.
The realisation of the process started with bilateral agreements
between the EU and certain countries of the region. Most of the
Mediterranean countries has signed Euro-Med contracts (Tunisia,
Morocco, Israel, the Palestine Authorities, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria,
Lebanon), while with Syria the negotiations are finished, but the
agreement has not been signed. 
Although the contracts signed are not identical in every detail,
their structure and the main points are the same. Besides the free
flow of goods, they include some minor specifications on the flow
of capital, the law of competition and the protection of invest-
ments. In addition to the financial and economic co-operation,
the political dialogue and the social- and cultural co-operation
were also included in the agreements. Overall, the Euro-Med
agreements are rather establishing a free-trade “light”, without
too many strict harmonisation requirements in crucial areas related
to trade.
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14Table 1 EU Trade Relations with Neighbors
Source: own, based partly on Dreyer (2012)
Type of relations Countries Entry into force Key characteristics
Accession
countries
FYROM Turkey, 
Iceland, Montenegro,
Serbia
Turkey (2005), FYROM (2005 –
no negotiations opened), Iceland
(2010 – pending), Montenegro
(2012),  Serbia (2013)
Towards full participation in EU Single Market, CAP,
Fisheries Policy
European
Economic Area
Norway, Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, Switzer-
land
EEA in force since 1994, Swiss Bi-
lateral I 1999
Full participation in Single Market (four freedoms), au-
tomatism in adaptation (exept Switzerland), No agricul-
ture included (by Swiss partly), External trade autonomy
remains.
Customs union Turkey, Andorraand San Marino 1995, 1991, 2002
Applying Common External Tariffs of EU. Agriculture
not included. Harmonistaion in several trade related ar-
eas, but not all.
Stabilisation 
and Association
Agreements 
(SAA)
Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia, Morocco 
offered for other 
ENP countries
2013-
Duty and quota free trade for manufactured goods, part-
ly for agricultural goods as well. Advanced liberalisation
in service sector and public procurement Domestic mar-
ket rules have to comply with EU regulations.
Euro-Med
Agreements
Jordan, Lebanon, 
Israel, Egypt, Tunisia,
Algeria, Morocco
1998-2006
Focus on tariffs in goods. No harmonisation require-
ments in standards and domestic regulations, no liber-
alisation requirements in several trade related fileld.
Common
Economic Space Russia Projected, stalled
Unclear, but projected liberalisation in trade and other
fileld as well.
Others Azerbaijan, Syria, Libya n/a
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Turkey
The Association Agreement with Turkey (‘Ankara Agreement’)
was signed in September 1963, more than 50 years ago. Similar
to the agreement signed with Greece in 1961, the Ankara Agree-
ment provided for a customs union between the country and the
Community at the end of a transitional period of two decades, to-
gether with other gradual liberalisation and harmonisation process-
es. The establishment of the free movement of labor and capital
were also among the goals, and the agreement let the possibility
of a full-fledged membership of Turkey in the Community open.
The Additional Protocol from 1970 set the timetable of the tran-
sition process in 22 years, and described the exact trade liberalisa-
tion measures to be taken. For the Turkish side, the basic incentive
behind the association agreement was rather political than eco-
nomic, aiming at establishing strong relations with Europe, and
following the main political rival Greece. The problems with the
implementation of trade liberalisation steps started soon on the
Turkish side, as a natural consequence of the trade development
strategy followed by Turkey that was based on import substitution
with strong protectionist measures. In 1978, Turkey asked for a
revision of the agreement, and cancelled the next stage of tariff re-
ductions, but the 1980 military coup in Turkey led to a freeze in
bilateral relations anyway. In the 1980’s, however, under the lead
of the new PM Turgut Özal, Turkey started with economic re-
forms, changing the state-led import substituting industrialisation
process to an export-oriented strategy based on competitive sec-
tors. The new economic strategy was much more compatible with
the trade liberalisation requirements of the Association Agreement,
and also made Turkey more interested in a better access to the Eu-
ropean internal markets. With the ease of political tensions be-
tween the two sides, Turkey applied for an EU membership in
1987, as the accession of three Mediterranean countries deterio-
rated the Turkish positions on the EU markets. Instead of starting
accession negotiations, the EU proposed the intensification of eco-
nomic relations, with a completion of the customs union.   
The Customs Union (CU) agreement between Turkey and the
EU came into effect on 1st January, 1996. The CU eliminated
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most trade barriers between the EU and Turkey, but is also meant
a harmonisation process, where Turkish technical standards, com-
petition policy, intellectual property rights were brought closer to
EU requirements. Some crucial sectors like agriculture were not
included, here bilateral concessions were applied.
Since the EU had already abolished the tariffs on most of the in-
dustrial goods imported from Turkey in 1971, the tariff adaptation
measures (erasing tariff towards EU members, and reducing tariffs
to Common External Tariff (CET) levels with other countries)
and also the costs were affecting Turkey.   
Central and Eastern Europe
The official relations between the EEC and the Central and East-
ern European countries were set up only after 1988, when the sys-
temic transformation in the Eastern bloc countries had started.
The first programs (PHARE) included aid and trade facilitacion
(use of GSP preferences).
The negotiations over a more ambitious plan started in 1990,
and ended up in December 1991 with Association Agreements
(Europe Agreements) signed by the parties (Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia at that time, later followed by other CEE coun-
tries). The most important element of the Association Agreement
was the free trade for industrial goods regulated in a reciprocal but
asymmetric way. It was rather unconventional and due mainly to
political motivations that the EU has been opening up sectors
where CEE countries were creating competition for EU producers
(textile, metal industries, agriculture). Bilateral free trade without
obstacles was created by 2002, while in agriculture, the agreement
resulted in reduced tariffs and higher quotas. Liberalisation steps
allowed larger participation in service supply and in public pro-
curement processes. A gradual approximation of associated coun-
tries to the acquis communautaire was also included in the agree-
ment. 
An important step towards trade liberalisation in the region was
the Central European Free Trade Agreement. The CEFTA agree-
ment – came into force in 1994 – created free trade among the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, while Slovenia,
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Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia joined later. The agreement – a
kind of antechamber of EU integration – helped the economic in-
tegration process of the CEE countries to the EU and made the
region more attractive for foreign investors.
EU Trade Policy with Neighbors 
– Current Trends and Future Prospects
In 2003, at the Thessaloniki European Council, when the acces-
sion treaties with the 10 future member countries had already been
signed, the EU created two new groups of non-EU European
countries. The Western Balkan countries got the promise of future
membership, while other European countries were covered by the
"wider Europe" project. The obvious loser of this categorization
was Moldova , as full member of the Stability Pact for South East-
ern Europe, which was placed to the "wider Europe" group, while
all other Stability Pact member countries got the opportunity to
become members of the EU.  
The Western Balkan countries
For the Balkans – the former Yugoslavian republics of Croatia, Ser-
bia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, plus
Kosovo, and Albania (i.e. the Western Balkan countries) – the EU
accession is an obvious strategic goal. The Western Balkan coun-
tries are surrounded totally by EU member countries. This means
that their European future is more or less evident, even if only in
the longer term. 
The framework invented for the region was the Stability and As-
sociation Process. The SAP started in 1999, and was strengthened
by the 2003 Thessaloniki summit. In the framework of the
Process, the Western Balkan countries signed Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreements with the EU, explicitly including provisions
for a future EU membership. 
The SAAs are based on the acquis communautaire, creating free
trade and expecting a gradual harmonisation of policies. The EU
offered autonomous trade preferences for Balkan countries in
2000, valid for nearly all exports. An extension of the CEFTA
17
Tamás Szigetvári18
agreement to Western Balkan countries and Moldova made free
trade among countries of the region possible.  
From the Western Balkan countries Croatia has already finished
the accession process, and joined the Union in July 2013. Mon-
tenegro and Serbia are official candidates and have already started
accession negotiations with the EU. FYROM, the Former Yu-
goslavian Republic of Macedonia, a candidate since 2005, was not
able to start negotiations due mainly to bilateral disputes with an
EU member neighbor, Greece. Albania is waiting for the green
light to be accepted as a candidate due mainly to domestic political
reasons, while Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo are struggling for
their “statehood”. In case of Bosnia Herzegovina, it is the lack of
understanding among the three nationalities that is an issue, while
in Kosovo the situation is worse, since its independence is not fully
accepted by some EU members.
Wider Europe
After the finalisation of the decision on a ‘Big Bang’ enlargement,
the EU wanted to initiate a new policy for the Eastern Periphery.
The newly formulated policy, however – on the insistence of the
Southern member states – included the EMP-participant Mediter-
ranean countries as well.
Originally, the concept of the new European Neighbourhood
Policy was intended to be offered (beside the EMP countries) to
four Eastern European countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova). In June 2004, a few months after the ‘Rose Revolution’
in Tbilisi, the decision was made to expand the ENP to the south-
ern Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
largest ‘neighbor’ of the EU, on the other hand, was not included
finally: Russia declined to be incorporated into the scheme and
opted for developing bilateral cooperation with the Union on an
allegedly more ‘equal’ basis, although it was open to accepting
similar policies and actions as those implemented with other coun-
tries involved in the scheme1. The EU intended to encourage
those states participating in the ENP to implement serious political
and economic reforms along with European standards in order to
create conditions for a future common space and market. 
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Eastern Europe
The EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 moved the external bor-
ders of the EU to the East, changing radically the EU’s geopolit-
ical and economic perception of the CIS region (former Soviet re-
publics) and its potential importance as economic and political
partner (particularly for the new EU member states). Before the
enlargements, CIS countries formed the second, outer ‘ring’ of
the EU neighbors, being geographically separated from the EU
by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Except for Russia,
the CIS countries economic and political importance for the EU-
15 was quite limited. The EU-15’s real economic and foreign pol-
icy interests in cooperation with CIS countries concentrated most-
ly on oil and natural gas supply from Russia, and on a relative
geopolitical stability of the post-Soviet area (avoiding the prolif-
eration of regional and ethnic conflicts).
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA)
The PCAs with the CIS countries were concluded between 1994
and 1996, and they came into effect’ in the period of 1997-1999.
The PCAs have established a political dialogue between the parties
and provided for a very wide range of issues for cooperation. 
Though the PCAs were drafted in similar fashion to the Europe
Agreements with CEE countries, there were important features
which gave the emerging relationship an entirely different charac-
ter. Despite the fact that in both types of agreement political dia-
logue was established, their aims differed substantially: dialogue
established by the EAs was used for the pre-accession process, the
one provided by the PCAs aims at consolidating the rapproche-
ment between the parties, as well as supporting the political and
economic changes taking place in these countries. Although sim-
ilar to the EAs, the PCA consisted of a ‘political conditionality’
1 The European Neighbourhood Policy does not cover countries which are in the process of
joining the European Union (Turkey, Croatia, Rep. of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro) and
those covered by the Stabilisation and Association process (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and
Kosovo) that have the same aim. The ENP also does not cover the EFTA states (Iceland, Nor-
way, Switzerland and Liechtenstein) as well.
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clause, this did not have the same effect, and since the membership
incentive was much more powerful than just establishing a wider
area of cooperation between the Union and the relevant country.
In addition, the institutions provided by the PCAs generally re-
sponded to those established by the EAs, which provides for sim-
ilar institutions referred to as ‘association’ instead of ‘cooperation’.
The major difference affecting the nature of the whole agreement,
is, that the Cooperation Council established within a PCA is not
entitled to take decisions imposing obligations on the signatories,
diminishing the importance of this institution.
The lack of incentive and eagerness by both sides to implement
the PCAs was central in the failure to achieve the aims of the agree-
ments. The partnership established was ‘a label on a mere trade
agreement’, where the parties failed to develop the PCA.
With the EU’s eastern enlargement, the situation changed sub-
stantially. Four CIS countries – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova – became direct land-neighbors of the enlarged Union.
The Caucasian countries still lie some 1000 km apart from the near-
est EU member (Romania), and only Georgia share a maritime
border with the enlarged EU by the Black Sea. With a Turkish EU
accession in the future, the other two states of the region, Armenia
and Azerbaijan would also become direct neighbors of the Union. 
The ENP has included the PCAs, as a sound basis for developing
future partnership. The ‘political dialogue’ feature introduced by
the PCA acquired a different nature within the ENP. The ENP
intended to be based on political dialogue, instead of a demand-
driven approach usual by the PCAs, where there was only one par-
ty, which was obviously deciding on the scope, measures and
mechanisms of the cooperation.2
Regional versus bilateral approaches
The European Union’s trade policy instruments are based not only
on bilateral cooperation, they may have multilateral forms like the
2 The necessity of a political dialogue was realised even before the launch of the ENP, when
the Council adopteda new Regulation for relaunching TACIS programme basing it ‘on an un-
derstanding that co-operation is a reciprocal process, encouraging a move from a “demand-
driven” to a dialogue driven approach’ (Ghazaryan, 2008).
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former Lomé Convention, and the different initiatives offered for
the neighbors: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and later the
Union for the Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership or the Black
Sea Synergy.
The ENP itself is primarily bilateral, but interlinks with regional
and sub-regional processes. Actually, the countries participating
in the ENP are quite different, the ‘common-nominator’ among
them being the rather Eurocentric approach based on their neigh-
borhood to EU. But the Eastern partners are all European coun-
tries, members of the Council of Europe, and as such, based on
paragraph 237 of the Rome Treaty, these countries have the right
to appeal for a full membership.
So the question still remains: why not to make the distinction
between countries and regions more explicit, and treat the “sub-
regional cluster” of the Union’s neighbors separately. The new
initiatives of the European Union seem to follow this logic.
Black Sea Synergy (BSS)
With the joining of two Black Sea littoral states, Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, the prosperity, stability and security of the neighbors
around the BlackSea have become an immediate concern to the
EU more than ever before. An EU initiative, called the Black Sea
Synergy was established in 2008, to develop the cooperation with-
in the Black Sea region and also between the region as a whole
and the European Union, thus adding a regional dimension to the
ENP. In this sense, the "Black Sea Synergy" completed the
"chain" of regional cooperation frameworks in the EU's neigh-
borhood, adding to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the
Northern Dimension.
The Black Sea Synergy has not established a secretariat but tried
to help political agreements and actions to be implemented by ex-
isting institutions, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
group (BSEC) or the Black Sea Forum (BSF). It was co-funded
from the EU's "neighborhood policy" and other existing funds.
Regular meetings were envisaged between foreign ministers of
Black Sea zone states: EU-member Romania, Bulgaria, Greece,
EU membership-candidate Turkey, ENP-participant Ukraine,
21
Tamás Szigetvári22
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, and Russia. Although
the Black Sea Synergy is still existing, without strong ’god-fathers’
in the EU, the BSS did not become a really influential institution,
and the Eastern Partnership Initiative, launched one year later,
took away both the political attention and the financial sources.
Union for the Mediterranean
The idea of the Union for the Mediterranean, previously known
as the "Mediterranean Union" was proposed by the French Pres-
ident Nicolas Sarkozy, originally implied a selective approach, sug-
gesting that only France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta should
confederate with the five North African countries Morocco, Alge-
ria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. The Union was supposed to
place emphasis on cooperation in the fields of counterterrorism,
illegal immigration, sustainable development and energy security.
It was planned as a looser grouping than the EU. Having been
backed especially by Italy and Spain, the proposed Union would
reduce imbalances between the North and the South of the EU.
Later it emerged as a possible alternative to Turkish membership
in the European Union, whereby Turkey would instead form the
backbone of the new Mediterranean Union. 
However, with modifications to the plan in March 2008, it was
agreed to be only "completing and enriching" the existing EU
structures and policy in the region, and build upon the existing
Barcelona process. It was also agreed that the project would in-
clude all the EU member states, not just those bordering the
Mediterranean, as originally planned by the French President.
Once Turkey was given a guarantee that the project would not be
an alternative to Turkish EU membership, it accepted the invita-
tion to participate. The Union for the Mediterranean became an
international organization initiated in July in 2008, as a develop-
ment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The act unites 43
states, every EU member with several non-EU countries that bor-
der the Mediterranean Sea3.
3 Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauri-
tania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya
remains an observer.
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It is still not clear, however, what kind of real novelty the Union
for the Mediterranean brings to the EU-Med relations, how the
new Union will help to resolve the problems of the region, and
whether it will operate better the former Mediterranean initiatives
of the EU. 
Eastern Partnership
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a project which was formally ini-
tiated by the European Union. It was presented by the foreign
minister of Poland with assistance from Sweden at a meeting of
the Council in May 2008.
In their Eastern Partnership proposal, Poland and Sweden sug-
gested that the existing instruments for cooperation between the
European Union and its Eastern neighbors would be complement-
ed by an intensified support of the EU. This support would be di-
rected toward those EU neighbors who have advanced furthest in
implementing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) instru-
ments. It allows for such countries’ gradual inclusion in EU poli-
cies and programs along with their gradual integration into the
EU common market. The plan was open in nature – other coun-
tries might join it when willing and ready. 
Unlike the Union for the Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership
does not have its own secretariat, but it is controlled directly by
the European Commission. 
As the Commission projected (EC, 2008), in the medium term
the free trade areas with each country and a greater support to
meet the related requirements could lead to the establishment of
a network of FTAs that can grow later into a Neighbourhood Eco-
nomic Community. The Partnership also consist a progressive visa
liberalisation, a deeper co-operation to enhance the energy security
of the partners and the EU, and a support for economic and social
policies designed to reduce disparities within each partner country
and across borders. A new Comprehensive Institution-Building
(CIB) programme was planned to improve the capacity of each
partner to undertake the necessary reforms.
Building on previous Commission proposals to strengthen the
ENP, the EaP wanted to reinforce the interaction with all six part-
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ners, always tailored to each partner’s specific situation and ambi-
tion. But, as Garcia states, compared to the Barcelona Process, the
ENP downgrades the regional dimension to ‘a complementary,
and in fact optional, element. (Garcia, 2013, p. 530) 
Bilateral relations
Currently, from the Eastern partners Ukraine, Moldova and Geor-
gia are in closest relation with the European Union. These coun-
tries were the first to have an Action Plan adopted. All of them
negotiated an Association Agreement with DCFTA in 2011-2012.
At the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, on the 28-29th No-
vember, the agreements with Georgia and Moldova were initiated.
Ukraine, on the other hand, postponed the signing of her already
ratified AA agreement, which lead to massive protests in Ukraine.
Azerbaijan also has ongoing negotiation on an Association
Agreement with the EU. The WTO membership of the country
is a prerequisite, however, to be able to start negotiations on a
DCFTA. The third Caucasian country, Armenia, also had negoti-
ations on an Association Agreement and on DCFTA with the EU.
The relation, however, cooled down, when Armenia voiced her
readiness to join the Eurasian Economic Community, a customs
union initiated by Russia, incompatible in its nature with a DCF-
TA with the EU.  
The third Eastern European country, Belarus supports the ENP
in general, but Brussels sets political conditions for a full-scale par-
ticipation of the country. Since 2003, however, Belarus has been
taking part in several ‘border programs’ (with Poland and Ukraine,
and with Baltic countries). Closer cooperation with the EU seems
to be possible only after a political change in the country. 
As far as the Southern partners are concerned, these countries
are non-European neighbors. From them, the three Maghreb
countries have the closest relations with Europe, mainly due to the
former French colonial rule. Morocco asked even for admission to
EC in 1987, but the Council refused the request, as Morocco is
not a European country. Morocco and Tunisia were the first to
sign the Euro-Med agreements and are doing everything to exploit
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the possibilities of the agreements. With Algeria there were several
problem areas, like the tense, almost war-like political status and
the unreadiness of the economy, i.e. the one-sided structure of the
exports, the closed market from the outer world. But Algeria’s nat-
ural resources are indispensable for the EU. Similar is the case with
Libya, but in the mid nineties the country opted out of the part-
nership. Later it became an observant, and, nowadays, both sides
try to warm up relations.
The five countries that are in the Eastern part of the Mediter-
ranean and the Palestine Authority are also part of the EU’s ENP
policy. Although the relation of these countries with the EU is
not as close as that of the Maghreb countries, their partnership
status existing since the 1970s and the ongoing peace talks in the
Near East and the EU’s more active role justified their involve-
ment. The co-operation between the Mashrek and the EU coun-
tries is rather dependant on the peace talks. Israel has an edge
over the others in the region as concerns its economy and is an
equal partner of the EU. At the beginning of the partnership
process, there was a hope for economic cooperation between Is-
rael and neighboring Arab countries. It did not come up to the
expectations, however, and the tension between the Israelis and
the Arabs remained.
Advanced forms of cooperation
The contractual frame for a stronger engagement, the Association
Agreements (AAs) would supersede the current agreements
(Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Euro-med Agree-
ments). The agreements have already been negotiated with
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, partners that were willing and able
to take on the resulting far-reaching commitments with the EU.
These new agreements would create a strong political bond and
promote further convergence by establishing a closer link to EU
legislation and standards. They may also advance cooperation on
Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and
Defence Policy. 
The AAs include the goal of establishing a deep and compre-
hensive free trade area (DCFTA) with each of the partner coun-
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tries. These DCFTAs can only be established with countries which
have joined the WTO4. They cover substantially all trade, includ-
ing energy, and aim at the highest possible degree of liberalisation
(with the asymmetry in the pace of liberalisation). The agreements
contain legally binding commitments on regulatory approximation
in trade-related areas, and they create real perspectives for en-
hanced movement of goods, capital and the supply of services to
be achieved over the long term. In parallel, sectorial measures
should be pursued to facilitate market access for partners.
To be able to exploit the fruits of the agreements, the EU will
encourage these countries to establish a network of regional free-
trade agreements among themselves based on the bilateral com-
mitments undertaken in the DCFTAs with the EU. This would
strongly enhance intra-regional trade and economic integration
and complement the countries' efforts to better integrate with the
EU economy. An important element contributing to further eco-
nomic integration is the diagonal cumulation of origin. 
To promote the legal movement of people, the EU initiated Mo-
bility Pacts with the Eastern Partnership countries. In this frame-
work the EU offered visa facilitation for its partners and, in the
longer-term, open dialogues on visa-free travel with all partners.
Of course, the speed of establishment always depends on the sit-
uation of each partner country. Currently Ukraine, Georgia and
Moldova have signed a readmission agreement parallel with visa
facilitation agreements with the EU.
In case of ENP countries it remains an important question, how-
ever, how far the harmonisation should go in different fields,
which regulations of the EU acquis communautaire should be
adapted by the neighboring countries. They get no full accession
perspective, and the more such alignments have to be done, the
more costly they are, and their rationality may be questioned by
the partner countries. 
As a further step, the idea of creating a Neighbourhood Eco-
nomic Community emerged, similarly to the already existing Eu-
ropean Economic Area. In the longer term such a Community
4 Currently Azerbaijan, Belarus, plus Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria have not concluded
their WTO accession negotiations. 
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could be offered full access to the single market.5 The lack of full
accession perspectives, however, makes the reality of such Com-
munity dubious. 
A further problem could be the financing of the costs of har-
monisation. As the case of the Mediterranean countries shows,
without substantial foreign investments following the liberalisa-
tion, the partners will not be able to enjoy the economic advan-
tages of the decision. Investments are needed both in the produc-
tive sectors and in infrastructure, since the official support coming
through EU founds (ENPI) are limited. The attraction of private
capital to these activities should be a priority agenda.
The European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)
Still, one of the major innovations in the Union’s relations with
neighboring countries consists in the establishment of a unique fi-
nancial instrument for the ENP as a whole. The European Neigh-
bourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) replaced the
TACIS and MEDA programmes in 2007.
For the budgetary period (2000-2006), the funds available were
approximately €5.3 billion for MEDA and €3.1 billion for TACIS,
as well as approximately €2 billion in European Investment Bank
lending for MEDA beneficiary countries and €500 million for
TACIS beneficiary countries. For the next budgetary period
(2007-2013), €12 billion in EU funding were available to support
these partners' reforms, an increase of 32% in real terms. Still, the
new endowment lied below the initial requests of the Commission
in the 2005 budget negotiations; it incorporated headings that
were previously included elsewhere in the EU budget.6
The ENPI was designed to target sustainable development and
approximation to EU policies and standards – supporting the
5 It would require the partners to develop the capacity of their economies to be able to fully
withstand the competitive pressures of the single market and to demonstrate not only a wil-
lingness to adopt all relevant elements of the EU acquis but also a capacity to implement them,
with comparable standards and practices. Substantially increased technical assistance and fun-
ding will be needed to achieve this objective. 
6 ENPI money has been used for the reconstruction of Lebanon, thus reducing the actual ava-
ilability of cash. (Missiroli, 2008)
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agreed priorities in the ENP Action Plans (as well as the Strategic
Partnership with Russia, which was previously also covered by the
TACIS programme). The new funding was planned to be much
more flexible, policy-driven instrument, where the allocation of
funds depended on the countries needs and absorption capacity
as well as their implementation of agreed reforms. Based on the
‘more-for-more’ principle the EU now offers greater incentives to
countries that make more progress towards reforms. An important
aspect of the ENPI is the improvement in cross-border coopera-
tion with countries along the EU’s external land and maritime bor-
ders thus avoiding new dividing lines. 
For the next budget period (2014-2020) the proposed financial
framework of the European Neighbourhood Initiative (ENI, re-
placing ENPI) will reach 18.2 billion euro, 40 per cent up on the
amount available under the ENPI from 2007-2013.7 How it will
be shared among Eastern and Southern countries is still unclear.
In the 2007-13 period, the shares have slightly changed: 62 per
cent of the Funds went to the South (it was 70 pre-2007), and 38
to the East (30 per cent previously). 
Evaluation of trade relations 
with neighbors and conclusions
How can we evaluate the effects of EU trade policy concerning
neighbors? As far as economic achievements of the EMP are consid-
ered, the results are mixed. The Southern partners have reduced their
tariff levels according to the Euro-med agreements, but they got no
access for their agricultural export to the European market as a com-
pensation, although this is the sector where the South has a compar-
ative advantage. And in reality, a further liberalisation by Euro-med
agreements was a goal neither for EU nor for Southern regimes.
The Euro-med Free Trade Area was scheduled to be achieved
by 2010 but without functioning free trade agreements between
the Southern countries, it still relies on bilateral structures8 and
7 Sources of datas: http://www.enpi-info.eu
8 The Agadir Agreement signed in 2004 by Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan intends to
gradually establish free trade between the signatories.
The development of EU trade policy towards neighboring countries 
threatens the region with the negative impacts of ‘hub and spoke’
effect9. An indirect proof to that is the fact that – despite previous
expectations – the level of FDI coming from European countries
to the region remained low. The use of the current system of rules
of origins is not attractive for FDI, especially for cross-border pro-
duction chains in the region. (Dreyer, 2012) A harmonisation of
investment and competition policies also stayed outside the scope
of the agreements.
To make the system of rules of origin more effective, the EU ex-
tended the Pan-European cumulation system to the Mediter-
ranean countries and created the Pan-Euro-Med cumulation of
origins. The system operates between 42 countries currently: the
EU, the EFTA members, Turkey and Euro-Med countries (Alge-
ria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and
the Palestinian Authority).10
But even with a broad system of cumulations created, the func-
tioning of a free trade area remains complicated and thus less at-
tractive for investors. As Krugman&Obstfeld states, free trade
agreements are politically straightforward but administratively a
headache, while customs unions are just the opposite (Krug-
man&Obstfeld, 2002). In case of a customs union, participant
countries have to agree on the common external tariffs used by
both sides, which generates political debates and needs compro-
mises from both sides.11 By free trade agreements, the countries
preserve their independent trade policy but the necessity of rules
of origins makes the operation of the free trade system adminis-
tratively more complicated.
For the ENP countries, a customs union may be administratively
more straightforward than a free trade agreement but politically it
9 The ‘hub and spoke effect” appears, when a large country (hub) has bilateral free trade ag-
reement with other (smaller, developing) countries (spokes), but there is no such agreement
among the other countries. The production will rather be in the ‘hub’ and exported to the free
trade partners, because a larger area can be achieved freely from there.
10 The diagonal cumulation means that products which have obtained originating status in one
of the 42 countries may be added to products originating in any other one of the 42 without
losing their originating status within the Pan-Euro-Med zone. http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_cus-
toms/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/ article_783_en.htm
11 By the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement Turkey agreed to adopt the Common Ex-
ternal Tariffs of the EU and to harmonize its foreign trade regulation accordingly without com-
promises.
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is much more complicated to construct. Here, the ‘neighboring’
countries willing to join the Customs Union, had to accept the al-
ready existing Common External Tariffs and so it is not the con-
struction but the sustainability of the agreement which is ques-
tionable. Due to fortunate circumstances, the Turkish CU
agreement was able to contribute to Turkey’s economic transition
and fast economic growth in the last decade. In case of the ENP
countries, however, the applicability of the model seems unlikely
without a perspective of a full-fledged EU membership.
And even for the EU, the goal is rather a harmonisation of leg-
islation, not the harmonistaion of external tariffs. The free trade
agreements negotiated by the EU are seen as bilateral means sub-
stituting multilateral liberalization and rule making in the WTO
framework. Especially, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Areas (DCFTA) are ’opportunity to negotiate regulatory and 
beyond-the-border issues that are not included in the Doha
Round and also to deal with ‘tough’ issues like agriculture, which
seems almost impossible to be solved in the multilateral talks.’
(Liargovas, 2013)
As regards to the ENP, in particular, the main reason for the EU
to follow the road of bilateralism is its objective to deepen the sub-
stance of trade agreements, enhancing more comprehensive trade
relations with its neighbors and thus, bringing its neighbors grad-
ually closer to the Single Market (Petrakos et al, 2013). The EU
offers DCFTA not only for Eastern partners but also for Mediter-
ranean partners.12 The negotiations on a possible DCFTA between
the EU and Morocco were started on 22 April, 2013 in Rabat.
The DCFTA will extend significantly beyond the scope of the ex-
isting Euro-med Association Agreement. The new agreement will
include trade in services, government procurement, competition,
intellectual property rights and investment protection, as well as a
harmonisation of industrial standards and technical regulations or
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
The ENP was aimed to bring the neighbors closer to the Union
both politically and economically. The Union can still rely on its
12 Currently, potential candidates for negotiating a DCFTA with the EU are Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco and Tunisia.
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‘high status’ among these countries and motivate them to under-
take necessary processes for the possible integration whether with-
in the region itself or with the Union. What is required from the
EU is the adaptation of elements in a way which will make it pos-
sible to meet the expectations of the neighboring countries con-
cerning integration. At the same time, this would allow the Union
to pursue its own interests and guarantee its own security. In order
to reach this, the Union would make the ENP a comprehensive
policy, where principles of conditionality, joint ownership and dif-
ferentiation do not contradict each other.
On the other hand, by adding the principles of joint ownership
and differentiation, the EU has tried to adapt the pre-accession
policy to the ENP as much as possible. However, these principles
do not sit well with the main principle of conditionality borrowed
from the enlargement experience. Nevertheless, the greatest ten-
sion comes generally from the question of using the enlargement
policy when membership is not offered, since in case of its success
the ENP will result in creating new candidates. Thus the EU can-
not demand similar commitments from both the countries who
are eventually offered membership and those who are offered just
a ‘stake in the internal market’. On the whole, the ENP seems to
suffer from being neither enlargement nor foreign policy. (Misroli,
2008): it has elements from both policies but neither from them
works properly. 
It can be concluded that trade relations and trade policy is con-
tinued to be important for the European Union to maintain its
the competitiveness but it also remains a foreign policy tool of the
EU, especially in case of neighboring regions. But since the EU
has much poorer countries in the neighborhood, integrating them
to the internal market is costly and may be dangerous: instead 
of creating stability, it may increase instability in the surrounding
regions.
In the neighborhood, rather polical than commercial goals and
considerations shape the EU trade policy.
So the need for strategic policy is a must for at least three other
reasons. First, the still existing framework policy, the ENP has to
do with at least 15 countries in four regions (Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus, the Levant, and North Africa), and the challenge is not
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to tailor ENP policies to individual countries but to address the
regional level. Second, the ENP has moved into the Russian sphere
of influence and challenges Russian interests and the EU can only
hope to cope with Russia if it is clear on its priorities on key issues
(trade, energy, democracy). And finally, the ENP overlaps with
American interest as well. Geopolitically, the United States has an
interest in influencing events in the Eurasian periphery and organ-
izing relationships with local partners that enable this influence
(Rynning – Jensen, 2008). 
The ENP signals that the EU is more ready and able to engage
in this type of partnership but it will depend on future develop-
ments how the ENP strategy will be able to handle the challenges
coming from the neighborhood. 
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